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Less than ten years after Grutter v. Bollinger [FN1] and Gratz v. Bollinger, [FN2] the U.S. Supreme Court has de-
cided to hear Fisher v. University of Texas, another race conscious admissions case in higher education. [FN3] In Fisher
v. University of Texas, Abigail Fisher, a white Texas resident, claimed that she was denied admission to the University
of Texas in Austin because of her race. [FN4] Specifically, she alleges that minority students with less stellar qualifica-
tions were admitted instead of her. Affirming the district court's opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor
of the University. [FN5] The Fifth Circuit did not find the university's plan to be an illegal quota or akin to racial balan-
cing. Instead, the court determined that the university followed the Grutter decision and carefully considered race as one
of many factors in admitting students. The Fifth Circuit declined to hear the case en banc. [FN6]
Many are predicting that the Fisher case will overturn the Grutter and Gratz decisions, or at the very least, limit fur-
ther the consideration of race in student assignment plans. [FN7] Since the Grutter and Gratz decisions, the composition
of the U.S. Supreme Court has changed. For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who wrote the majority opinion in
Grutter, has been replaced by Justice Samuel Alito, who appears to doubt the constitutionality of race–conscious policies
in education. To illustrate, his 2007 opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School School District
No. 1 [FN8] (PICS) gives us some insight into his views on such policies. Likewise, Justice Elena *2 Kagan, who was
appointed after Justice John Paul Stevens retired, has disqualified herself from the case because of her work on the topic
as the U.S. Solicitor General. Thus, the decision will be made by only eight justices. If the Court overturns or limits the
holding in Grutter, universities throughout the U.S. will need to adjust their admissions policies, and the number of
minority students at some universities will likely decrease. There will be implications for public elementary and second-
ary schools as well.
In order to set the necessary context for an examination of Fisher, the article will briefly highlight the equal protec-
tion analysis and the outcomes in earlier Supreme Court decisions involving race–conscious admissions, including the
University of California Regents v. Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and PICS. [FN9] It also discusses the 2011 Guidance from the
U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice on implementing race–conscious policies in element-
ary, secondary, and post–secondary education. The article then examines the amicus briefs filed on behalf of Abigail
Fisher and the University of Texas. In analyzing the amicus briefs, particular attention is focused on whether social sci-
ence research was relied upon. Specifically, the social science research was rated and then discussed in order to highlight
the range of research relied upon by amici.
Legal Background
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Students who believe that they have been denied admission to an educational program as a result of race, will likely
argue that these programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection
Clause states that “no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” [FN10]
The Clause has been interpreted to mean that “similar individuals ... be dealt with in a similar manner by the govern-
ment.” [FN11]
Under the Equal Protection Clause, when a court considers the constitutionality of a government policy, it will apply
one of three standards or judicial levels of review (i.e., strict scrutiny, mid–level scrutiny, and rational basis). [FN12] The
easiest standard to satisfy is the rational basis standard. [FN13] When the court applies this standard, it will uphold the
governmental action if the government is pursuing a legitimate governmental objective and if there is a rational relation
between the means chosen by the government and the state objective. [FN14] Sexual orientation falls under this level of
scrutiny. Thus, if a school policy treated a gay teacher differently than other teachers, the district would need to demon-
strate a rational reason for the policy and show that there is a rational relation between the means chosen by the school
and the state's objective. The next highest standard of review is known as middle–level or intermediate scrutiny. Under
this standard, the governmental policy has to *3 be substantially related to an important government objective. [FN15]
Gender falls under this level of scrutiny. [FN16]
Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of review used by the courts and the most difficult to satisfy. This level of scru-
tiny is employed when race is at issue. Under strict scrutiny, the government must first show that its decision to treat
people differently is justified by a compelling state interest. [FN17] The University of Texas' admissions policy will be
subject to strict scrutiny review. In Fisher, the Court would likely first examine whether promoting diversity in higher
education is a “compelling governmental interest.” Second, the Court will decide whether the admissions program at the
University of Texas at Austin is “narrowly tailored.” [FN18] To be constitutional, a racial classification must satisfy both
parts. [FN19] If a school district is found to have engaged in racial discrimination and violated the Equal Protection
Clause, the district would also have violated Title VI and IV. [FN20]
The Context in Higher Education
In order to provide a background for the Fisher case, it is important to understand the Supreme Court's prior de-
cisions with regard to race–conscious admissions or student assignment programs. Before Gratz and Grutter, the only
Supreme Court case to address race–conscious admissions in higher education was Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke in 1978. [FN21] The Supreme Court's 1978 Bakke decision focused on the University of California Davis
Medical School's consideration of race as part of its admissions programs. [FN22] The plaintiff, Allan Bakke, a white
male who was rejected twice by the medical school, alleged that its admissions program had violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by excluding him because of his race. [FN23] He argued that the school had accepted less qualified minority
applicants when it reserved sixteen out of 100 places for disadvantaged minority students—claiming that the minority
students who filled these sixteen spots had lower GPAs and test scores than rejected white students. [FN24] He further
noted that he had a 3.46 undergraduate grade point average and the students admitted into the special program had an av-
erage grade point average of 2.88. [FN25]
Before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, the Davis admissions program was considered by a state court and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, which both found that the medical school's race–conscious policy to be unconstitutional. [FN26]
As a result of these decisions, the University could not consider race in making admissions decisions. [FN27] Similarly,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that *4 the University's program was unconstitutional. In a highly divided opinion, the
Court stressed that the medical school's policy of reserving a specific number of seats to be filled only by minorities was
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unconstitutional. [FN28] The Court, however, reversed a lower court's ruling that race could never be considered a factor
in admissions programs. [FN29] Justice Powell noted that the development of the nation's future is dependent on future
leaders well–versed and exposed to the diversity of the American people, and a broader definition of diversity where race
and ethnicity is an important factor along with other qualifications and characteristics is a compelling state interest.
[FN30] He further posited that it may be permissible for an admissions program to examine diversity holistically while
considering several characteristics (e.g., personal traits, service or employment, leadership experience) of each applicant.
[FN31] Due to the many opinions filed in the Bakke decision, some universities were unclear whether or to what extent
race could be used in admissions programs. [FN32] The Grutter and Gratz decisions clarified this confusion to some ex-
tent.
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority upholding the law school's admissions program at the University
of Michigan Law School. [FN33] In this 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed that part of the lower court's judg-
ment that enjoined the University from considering the race of the applicant. [FN34] The Court adopted Justice Powell's
vision in Bakke, which encompassed a wide variety of qualifications where race was only one of many factors con-
sidered. [FN35] Specifically, the majority reasoned that the only holding for the Court in Bakke was that a “[s]tate has a
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin.” [FN36] The Court endorsed Justice Powell's view in Bakke that student body di-
versity is a compelling interest that could be used in university admissions if narrowly tailored. [FN37] Significantly, the
Court found that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit universities from a “narrowly tailored use of race in admis-
sions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body.” [FN38]
*5 After the Court reasoned that diversity was compelling, it addressed whether the law school's program was nar-
rowly tailored (e.g., the policy was not too broad). [FN39] In examining whether the law school's policy was narrowly
tailored, the Court noted that it required admissions teams to consider other criteria beyond grades and test scores, which
were referred to as 'soft variables.' [FN40] For example, a soft variable could include letters of recommendation, the
quality of the undergraduate institution, the applicant's personal statement, and whether the applicant chose challenging
undergraduate courses. [FN41] Some other bases for diversity may include an admittee who lived or traveled widely
abroad, one who is fluent in several languages, or one who has an exceptional record in community service. [FN42] The
law school's holistic approach in admitting students survived the strict scrutiny review. [FN43]
Interestingly, the Court found that narrow tailoring does not require that “exhaustion of every conceivable
race–neutral alternative” be attempted before a race–conscious policy is implemented, but it does require that universities
consider race–neutral plans in good faith. [FN44] Race–neutral plans, for example, might include using a lottery system
for admission or placing less emphasis on test scores in admissions. The Court also pointed out how some race–neutral
plans would be difficult to adopt at the graduate school level. [FN45] The Court also criticized percentage plans because
“they may preclude the university from conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body
that is not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university.” [FN46]
It was also noteworthy that the Court proposed that race–conscious policies should be limited in time. [FN47] Spe-
cifically, when race–conscious admissions programs have a termination point, it “assures all citizens that the deviation
from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter ... ” [FN48] Justice O'Connor sug-
gested a timeline when she wrote: “We expect that 25 years from now the use of racial preferences will no longer be ne-
cessary to further the interest approved today.” [FN49] Thus, it is surprising that only nine years after Grutter, the Su-
preme Court decided to hear another very similar case when it granted certiorari in Fisher v. Texas.
288 WELR 1 Page 3
288 Ed. Law Rep. 1
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
The 6–3 Gratz opinion was issued the same day as Grutter, but in this case the majority struck down the undergradu-
ate affirmative action program because it was not narrowly tailored. [FN50] With Justice Rehnquist writing for the ma-
jority, the Court held that the admissions program in the College of Literature, Science and the Arts automatically dis-
tributed twenty points to every single applicant from an “underrepresented minority” group. [FN51] The Court reasoned
that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke emphasized taking a *6 more holistic approach to admissions. [FN52] Specifically,
the Court stressed that Justice Powell's reasoning would not permit any single characteristic to automatically ensure an
identifiable contribution to a university's diversity. [FN53] The undergraduate's program of automatically distributing
twenty points relied too heavily on race and was not flexible. As a result, the undergraduate program was found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause. As noted, in Grutter, the Court defined how race–conscious university admissions programs
must be designed to be narrowly–tailored—they cannot be a quota system that insulates certain applicants from competi-
tion with others based on race or ethnicity. [FN54] The law school's admissions program in Grutter satisfied Bakke's dis-
tinction of recognizing race or ethnicity only as a “plus” among other characteristics, even if the school's goal was to at-
tain a critical mass of underrepresented minority students. The law school considered each applicant as an individual,
looking at how each may contribute to the diversity of the School. [FN55] Within these two decisions, the Supreme
Court clarified that having a diverse student body is a compelling interest. The Court dispelled the notion that diversity in
education had been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by its affirmative action decisions since Bakke. [FN56]
The Context in K–12 Education
Although the focus of the Fisher case is on higher education, the Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools (PICS) decision
will also be briefly examined because Fisher will certainly have an impact on K–12 education—especially if the Court
no longer finds diversity to be a compelling state interest in education.
In PICS, the Supreme Court addressed to what extent the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution allows school districts to use race–conscious plans to maintain an integrated public school system.
[FN57] In an attempt to integrate student bodies, the school districts in Seattle and Louisville voluntarily implemented
integration plans to confront de facto segregation. [FN58] In Louisville, the K–12 public schools were at one time ra-
cially segregated by law. [FN59] In Seattle, there was never de jure segregation, but de facto segregation existed. [FN60]
The student assignment policies in both districts were intended to keep schools from segregating by neighborhood. In as-
signing students to particular schools, the school districts considered a number of factors, including race. Parents in both
school *7 districts filed lawsuits contending that the consideration of race in the student assignment plans was unconsti-
tutional. [FN61]
In a 5–4 decision, the Court found that the student assignment plans employed by the district were not narrowly
tailored. The plans were considered unconstitutional because they relied on a racial classification system that did not
consider applicants in a holistic way. [FN62] In examining whether the programs were narrowly tailored, the Court ap-
plied a four–part test from Grutter. In doing so, the Court assessed whether the school districts had considered workable
race–neutral alternatives, whether the districts' programs provided for a holistic and individualized review of students,
whether the programs had minimized undue burdens on other students, and whether its plan is limited in time and subject
to periodic review. [FN63]
At least four of the justices would not permit nearly any type of racial classification. Specifically, Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, wrote an opinion banning race–conscious school assignment plans.
[FN64] At least five justices, however, found student body diversity to be a compelling state interest. In so doing, the
Court noted that there are two interests that qualify as compelling. The first is remedying the effects of past discrimina-
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tion, and the second is diversity. Regarding the first interest, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the Seattle and Louisville
school districts could not demonstrate that they were currently segregated by law. Specifically, the Court stated that the
Seattle public schools were never segregated by law and that the court–ordered decree in Louisville had already been dis-
solved. Regarding the second interest, Chief Justice Roberts declared that unlike the Grutter decision, Seattle and Louis-
ville relied too heavily on race as the only measure of diversity in their assignment plans. The Chief Justice also noted
that unlike Grutter, the districts sought a defined range of minority students, which equated to racial balancing. In es-
sence, the Court reasoned that both the Seattle and Louisville school districts failed to carry the heavy burden of demon-
strating that the diversity they sought to achieve justified the means they had chosen.
In Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, he refused to sign on to almost half of the Chief Justice's opinion but he did
agree with the Court's conservative members to strike down the Louisville and Seattle plans. [FN65] Specifically, he
agreed that race–conscious student assignment plans were generally not acceptable, but he rejected Chief Justice Robert's
stricter interpretation of such plans as always being unconstitutional. [FN66] He wrote that “[t]his Nation has a moral
and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity
for all its children.” [FN67]
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined, asserted that
the PICS decision is one that “the *8 Court and the Nation will come to regret.” [FN68] The dissent reasoned that the as-
signment plans served a compelling interest and were narrowly tailored. Justice Breyer also asserted that in the past the
Court has approved “narrowly tailored” race–conscious plans that were similar to those in Seattle and Louisville. [FN69]
In referring to the plurality's misinterpretation of Brown, Justice Breyer stated that “[t]he lesson of history is not that ef-
forts to continue racial segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial integration. In-
deed, it is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950s to Louisville and Seattle in the modern
day.” [FN70]
Although a majority of the Court in Grutter, Gratz, and PICS found that student body diversity was a compelling
state interest, some schools and universities struggled to determine admissions plans that would be permissible. As such,
the U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice issued Guidelines in December 2011 to help school of-
ficials in both public K–12 schools [FN71] and universities that might be considering race in student assignment policies.
This guidance explains to schools how they might consider race to avoid racial isolation and increase diversity within the
K–12 context:
School districts should first determine if they can meet their compelling interests by using race–neutral ap-
proaches. Race–neutral approaches can be used for decisions about individual students, such as admissions de-
cisions for competitive schools or programs, as well as for decisions made on an aggregate basis, such as the draw-
ing of zone lines that affect a large number of students. [FN72]
It is important to note that school districts are required to use race neutral approaches only if they are workable with-
in a given context. Thus, in some limited circumstances a K–12 school district may consider race–conscious policies.
[FN73] Regarding the guidance to institutions of higher education, the guidance stated: “Departments recognize the com-
pelling interest that postsecondary institutions have in obtaining the benefits that flow from achieving a diverse student
body.” [FN74] The guidance does suggest that an institution could try to achieve its desired diversity goals through
race–neutral approaches. It does stress though that attempting a race–neutral approach is not necessary if the university
finds the approach unworkable. Importantly, if a university does consider race in admitting students, it must do so in an
individualistic and holistic way–as prescribed by Grutter. [FN75] Thus, the guidance addresses the degree of flexibility
that elementary, secondary, and postsecondary institutions have to take proactive steps, in a manner consistent with prin-
ciples set out in Grutter, to meet this compelling interest. Additionally, the guidance *9 stresses that the Court has made
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clear that K–12 schools and universities can take steps where the race of individual students are taken into account in a
narrowly tailored manner. [FN76]
The Fisher v. University of Texas Decisions
Before the Grutter decision, students who were within the top ten percent of their graduating class at high school in
Texas were automatically admitted to the public university system. This program is known as the “Top Ten Percent
Plan” and it does not consider race in admissions. [FN77] Instead, the program attempts to increase racial diversity by
pulling students from racially homogenous high schools in Texas. This race–neutral plan was enacted by the state legis-
lature in response to a Fifth Circuit decision that prohibited the consideration of race in admissions. [FN78] After the
Grutter decision, administrators at the University of Texas at Austin, added race to a long list of factors that they would
consider in admitting students for the spots that remained after the ten percent system was employed in order to further
increase racial diversity at the University.
When Abigail Fisher applied in 2008, she just missed the cutoff score at her high school and was not within the top
ten percent. As a result, her name was then entered into a separate pool. Specifically, the Top Ten Percent Program filled
about 80% of the spots within the class and the separate pool was used to fill the remaining 20% of spots. As noted, with-
in this pool of students, the University used a complex admissions policy where race might be considered among many
factors in admitting students.
In Fisher's petition, she argued that the University violated her rights to equal protection as well as other federal civil
rights statutes. She contends that the University of Texas' admissions policies go beyond what is permissible in Grutter.
[FN79] Specifically, even though the Supreme Court recognized in Grutter that universities have a compelling interest in
promoting classroom diversity, she believed that the Top Ten Percent Plan had already increased racial diversity at the
University of Texas. Thus, when the University considered race as a factor for the remaining slots, it equated to racial
balancing, which she argued is not permissible under Grutter. She further claimed that even if the University of Texas'
policy aligns with Grutter, Grutter should still be overruled. [FN80] The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that University officials took a legally permissible multi–factor approach in the admissions process. The
district court reasoned that “it would be difficult for UT to construct an admissions policy that more closely resembles
the policy approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.” [FN81] Both the federal district court and the Fifth Circuit inter-
preted Grutter as giving deference to University officials when creating admissions policies in good faith. The Fisher
case will be heard by the Supreme Court in October 2012.
There were seventeen amicus briefs filed on behalf of Abigail Fisher, seventy–four amicus briefs filed in support of
the University of Texas in *10 Austin and two briefs that did not specifically support either party. We coded the briefs to
determine how much of the arguments relied on social science research. Briefs that did not mention any research or very
little research were given a 0. Briefs that briefly mentioned only a few studies were given a 1 and those that discussed
and cited some studies were given a 2. Briefs that relied heavily on social science research in making their arguments
were given a 3. For the purposes of this paper, we defined social science research as empirical data published in
peer–reviewed journals or books; statistics from news articles were not included. We took James Ryan's approach of in-
cluding studies that establish “correlation or causation.” [FN82] Overall, we analyzed 93 amicus briefs. Tables 1–3 out-
line these amicus briefs.
Table 1: Amicus Briefs Filed in Support of the Petition-
er
Social Science Research Cited
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The Cato Institute 0
The California Association of Scholars et al. 1
Current and Former Federal Civil Rights Officials 1
The Pacific Legal Foundation et al. 1
Gail Heriot et al. 2
The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under
Law et al.
1
Abigail Thernstrom et al. 3
The Southeastern Legal Association et al. 0
The Hon. Allen B. West 0
The Asian American Legal Foundation and the Judicial
Education Project
1
The American Center for Law and Justice 0
Scholars of Economics and Statistics 3
Judicial Watch, Inc. and Allied Education Foundation 1
Mountain States Legal Foundation 0
The Texas Association of Scholars 0
The American Civil Rights Union 0
The Center for Individual Rights 0
As noted above, there were amicus briefs filed on behalf of Fisher that relied on research when framing arguments
against the University of Texas' plan. The Brief of Scholars and Economic Statistics [FN83] relied on the work of John
Lott Jr., J. Mark Ramseyer, and Jeffrey Standen to demonstrate no positive correlation between minority enrollment and
the grades of minority students. [FN84] This brief also discussed stereotypes and stressed that no empirical work as-
signed any quantitative significance to stereotype threat effects. [FN85] *11 Likewise, Abigail Thernstrom et al. critic-
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ally examined the social science research that the Court may rely upon in Fisher. Through their critique of the research,
they questioned whether the research demonstrates that student body diversity is a compelling state interest. Their ana-
lysis concludes that race–conscious admissions programs undermine race relations and perpetuates stereotypes. [FN86]
The other briefs in support of Fisher did not rely on research to the same extent. The American Center for Law and
Justice mentioned that “[m]any modern biologists and anthropologists, however, criticize racial classification as arbitrary
and of little use in understanding the variability of human beings.” [FN87] This brief also cited a Yale University Semin-
ar Presentation when discussing racial labeling in Rwanda. [FN88] The brief from the Current and Former Federal Civil
Rights Officials referred to a 2008 study by George La Noue and Kenneth Marcus on race–neutral alternatives in higher
education. [FN89] Other briefs cited some empirical studies regarding the negative effects of race–preferential admis-
sions, Gallup Polls, and surveys of professors regarding race–preferential admissions. [FN90] The California Association
of Scholars et al. also cited research regarding race, SAT scores, and admission rates published in Thomas Espenshade
and Alexandria Walton Radford's 2009 study, “No Longer Separate, Not Yet Equal: Race and Class in Elite College Ad-
mission and Campus Life.” [FN91] Interestingly, the brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation explicitly argued that social
science research should not be relied upon as a rationale for race–based admissions and discrimination. Ironically, it then
used some research to buttress and support its own positions by citing Roger Clegg, Thomas Sowell, and Peter Wood.
[FN92]
Many of the briefs focused on only legal arguments. For example, the brief for the Southeastern Legal Foundation ar-
gued mainly that the Constitution is colorblind and that the University went beyond what was required in Grutter.
[FN93] The reliance on pure legal arguments was present in both the briefs submitted on behalf of Fisher and the Uni-
versity of Texas.
TABLE 2: Amicus Briefs Filed in Support of the Re-
spondent
Social Science Research Cited
The United States 1
The American Association for Affirmative Action 3
American Social Science Researchers 3
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education
Fund et al.
3
Association of American Medical Colleges et al. 3
Amherst University et. al. 2
The Anti-Defamation League 1
Coalition of Bar Associations of Color 3
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The National Black Law Students Association 3
Social and Organizational Psychologists 3
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2
Fordham University et. al. 1
Human Rights Advocates 1
Emory OUTLaw 2
Former FCC Commissioners, et. al. 2
The Family of Herman Sweatt 1
The United Negro College Fund 3
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education
Fund et. al.
2
The Harvard Graduate School of Education Students for
Diversity
2
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the UT Black Student
Alliance
2
Empirical Scholars 3
Undergraduate and Graduate Student Organizations of
California
3
Appalachian Stale University et. al. 2
Kimberly West-Faulcon 3
National League of Cities et. al. 3
Dr. Robert D. Putnam 3
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The Houston Community College System 1
Experimental Psychologists 3
Former LIT Student Body Presidents 0
The Association of American Law Schools 1
College Board et. al. 2
The State of California 2
Asian American Center for Advancing Justice et. al. 3
U.S. Senators 3
Small Business Owners 0
The Coalition of Black Male Achievement Initiatives 2
Religious Organizations 0
The President and Chancellors of the University of
California
1
The American Council on Education et. al. 2
The National Women's Law Center et. al. 3
Members of Congress 0
Members of the Texas State Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives
0
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 0
The NAACP et. al. 1
The American Civil Liberties Union 1
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The Brennan Center for Law and Justice at NYU
School of Law
3
The Council for Minority Affairs at Texas A&M et. al. 1
The National Education Association et. al. 2
The American Bar Association 0
The New York State Bar Association 0
The National Latino Organizations 1
American Law Teachers 1
The State of New York et. al. 0
The Advancement Project 0
Fortune 100 and Other Leading American Businesses 0
Leading Public Research Universities 1
Former Senior DOD/National Security/Military Leaders 0
The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action et. al. 0
Brown University et. al. 0
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et. al. 2
Howard University School of Law Civil Rights Clinic 1
The United States Student Association 2
National Association of Basketball Coaches et. al. 2
The California Institute of Technology et. al. 2
The American Jewish Committee et. al. 3
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Dean Robert Post and Dean Martha Minow 1
The American Psychological Association 3
The Constitutional Law Scholars et. al. 0
The Boston Bar Association et. al. 1
Distinguished Alumni of the University of Texas at
Austin
1
Teach For America 0
David Boyle 0
The Law School Admission Council 1
The American Educational Research Council 3
*13 Similar to the amicus briefs submitted on behalf of Fisher, some of the amicus briefs filed on behalf of the Uni-
versity of Texas cited little or no research. However, those that did cite studies often explained the educational benefits
that depend upon opportunities that result from student interaction in a racially diverse classroom, which cannot be
achieved with few minorities enrolled. These briefs suggested that without diverse experiences and viewpoints within the
classroom, students would be missing out on an important aspect of their education. Larger scale studies were included
within this discussion to help demonstrate the importance of diversity. This section will highlight a few of the more
widely–cited studies included in the briefs filed on behalf of the University of Texas. Some of the studies cited found
cognitive skills improved in diverse learning environments. For example, Nicholas Bowman conducted a meta–analysis
of 23 studies and found positive gains in students' cognitive development with increased diversity. [FN94] Likewise,
Sylvia Hurtado's longitudinal study of over 4,400 students at nine public universities found that diversity is related to im-
proved thinking skills and analytical problem solving. [FN95] Likewise, the American Educational Research Association
et al.'s brief argued for the *14 benefits of “[i]nformal interactions with diverse peers” increase with diversity. [FN96]
The brief cited the work of Thomas Nelson Laird to show that these interactions are more likely to cause students to be
more self–confident academically and take a personal responsibility to improve society. [FN97] Another study analyzed
500 different studies and reported that diversity reduces prejudice. [FN98] Other studies highlighted that diversity has
also been related to increased engagement, [FN99] improved learning, [FN100] better leadership skills, [FN101] and
more lively and interesting classroom discussions. [FN102]
In addition, many universities also submitted amicus briefs defending the University of Texas in Austin for using
race and ethnicity in their admissions practice. For example, Amherst College along with thirty–six other private colleges
and universities noted the importance of directly seeking diversity for their smaller student population and cited research
finding that diversity not only benefits higher education institutions but also the private sector, and the overall society
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and economy. [FN103]
TABLE 3: Amicus Briefs Filed in Support of Neither
Party
Social Science Research Cited
Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor Jr. 3
The Equal Employment Advisory Council 0
There were two amicus briefs filed in support of neither party. The brief from Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor,
however, used research in arguing against race–conscious admissions programs. Thus, it is unclear why this brief was not
filed on behalf of Fisher. The authors suggest that racial preferences in higher education often undermine minority
achievement and cite empirical work to support this proposition. Sander cited his own work from 2005 to show that ra-
cial preferences damage the academic performance of black law students because of lower bar passage and graduation
rates. [FN104] The brief *15 submitted by the Equal Employment Advisory Council stressed the impact that the decision
could have on private sector employers with regard to federally mandated affirmative action requirements for federal
contractors. [FN105]
Discussion
Several education and legal scholars have commented on the role social science research could play in the judicial
system, [FN106] and others have discussed how the courts might rely on this research in shaping educational policy.
[FN107] It is difficult to determine whether social science research has had an impact on decisions. Legal scholar, James
Ryan, argued that the influence “remains fairly limited.” [FN108] We contend that this is a missed opportunity and argue
that social science research should play a role in the Court's upcoming decision in Fisher. Specifically, the research in
those briefs coded with a three in Table 1–3 could be particularly helpful to the Court. The most well–known case that
relied on social science research was the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education. [FN109] In
Brown, footnote 11 highlighted the social science research, which demonstrated the social and psychological harm black
students experience as a result of racial segregation. Additionally, we know from Grutter and PICS that social science re-
search was considered to some extent. In Grutter, the Court acknowledged the amicus briefs and the studies that high-
lighted the benefits of diversity in earlier race–conscious decisions. [FN110] Specifically, the Court noted that major
American businesses need a diverse workforce and that the U.S. Military needs a racially diverse *16 officer corps for
“the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.” [FN111] In Grutter, most of the amicus
briefs filed in support of the university's admission plan noted that diversity is essential for the interplay of ideas in a na-
tion that is becoming increasingly diverse. [FN112] Moreover, these briefs argued that informal learning results from
campuses that recruit students of different, races, religions, gender, and backgrounds. [FN113] In PICS, Justice Breyer's
dissent more carefully considered social science research, [FN114] but this research was quickly dismissed by Justice
Thomas in his concurring opinion. Justice Thomas wrote that “the dissent unquestioningly cites certain social science re-
search to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. In reality, it is far from apparent that co-
erced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement.” [FN115]
But courts routinely admit competing expert testimony to assist the factfinder in deciding a case and judges have “a fair
amount of latitude on how best to use the expert's testimony to understand the information presented.” [FN116] Of
course some observers might argue that much of the research cited in the amicus briefs has been highly politicized or that
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researchers may have an outcome in mind before they begin their study. [FN117] Thus, experts could play a role in sort-
ing out which social research has employed more rigorous methodologies. [FN118]
In addition to the context of litigation involving integration and race–conscious policies, social science research has
been prevalent in gay–rights cases and has helped courts justify their opinions—dismissing the myths of homosexual-
ity–a largely controversial topic between science and morality. In these cases, social science has been heavily cited in an
effort to educate society and the court about a little–known societal phenomenon. [FN119] Indeed, using social science
information in the modern legal era has increasingly been accepted to create change in society to dispel prevailing moral
and societal norms to achieve consequential results. [FN120] Similar to gay–rights cases and some of the earlier
race–conscious cases, the amicus briefs submitted in the Fisher case can provide valuable information to the Court. We
urge the Court to incorporate social science into its decision of the Fisher case not only to better understand the value of
a diverse education system, but also to better educate the public about the societal and educational benefits of diversity.
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